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EXPANDING SELLER LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT OF WASHINGTON-Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107,
744 P.2d 1032 (1987).
The Washington Public Power Supply System's ("WPPSS") aban-
donment of two nuclear power projects led to the largest municipal
bond default in American history.' This default generated an unprec-
edented volume of securities litigation.2 Among the many court deci-
sions handed down in the wake of the WPPSS fiasco was the
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Haberman v. WPPSS. I The
Haberman court significantly expanded the civil liability provisions of
the Securities Act of Washington ("WSA").4 In Haberman, the court
expressly included as a "seller" the bond issuer and implicitly sug-
gested that professional consultants who provide services in conjunc-
tion with a bond issuance may also be held liable as "sellers."
Seller liability was a significantly contested issue in Haberman
because WSA's seller liability subsection5 is its most attractive civil
liability provision. The subsection sets a low culpability standard by
requiring negligence rather than scienter.6 It offers stern remedies in
the form of rescission or damages plus interest, costs and attorneys'
fees, and no relief is given to defendants who assert a good-faith or due
diligence defense.7
Read literally, the statute requires strict privity between the buyer
and another person in a securities transaction before that other person
can be held liable as a seller.' However, the Haberman court seemed
1. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 117,744 P.2d 1032, 1044 (1987); Nat'l LJ., Apr.
13, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
2. Nat'l L.L, supra note 1, at 33-34.
3. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 744 P.2d 1032.
4. Securities Act of Washington, ch. 282, 1959 Wash. Laws 1311 (codified at WAsH. REV.
CODE ch. 21.20 (1987)).
5. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987) provides:
Any person, who offers or sells a security in violation of any provisions of RCW 21.20.010 or
21.20.140 through 21.20.230, is liable to the person buying the security from him or her, who
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together
with interest at eight percent per annum from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable
attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of
the security, or for damages if he or she no longer owns the security. Damages are the
amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less (a) the value of the security when the
buyer disposed of it and (b) interest at eight percent per annum from the date of disposition.
(Emphasis added.)
6. Cf id. § 21.20.430(7) (scienter required to hold certain persons liable who materially aid in
offer or sale of government-issued securities).
7. Cf id. § 21.20.430(3) (controlling persons allowed good-faith defense).
8. Id. § 21.20.430(1).
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preoccupied with imposing liability on bond issuer WPPSS despite its
lack of privity with bond buyers. Using nebulous language that does
little to clarify who can or should be held liable as a seller, the court
broadly interpreted "seller" to include anyone whose acts are a "sub-
stantial contributive factor" in the sales transaction.' The court, with-
out examining the implications of its decision for the professional
consultant defendants in Haberman, thereby adopted a liberal reading
of the statute that suggests that anyone tangentially involved with a
sales transaction might now be forced to defend against WSA seller
liability claims.
This Note examines the WSA seller liability subsection, its lan-
guage, legislative history and case law. The Haberman decision is
reviewed in the context of the WPPSS default and other resulting liti-
gation. The majority's rationale for redefining "seller" and the dis-
sent's repudiation of that rationale is examined. The result apparently
sought by the Haberman court is compared with the result actually
achieved. Suggestions for defending against WSA seller liability claims
are given. Finally, specific statutory amendments are recommended to
clarify the scope of WSA seller liability.
I. SELLER LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES
ACT OF WASHINGTON
WSA1° encompasses a number of provisions. The statute requires
registration of most securities sold within the state." It mandates
registration and regulation of broker-dealers, securities salesmen and
investment advisers.12 The statute prohibits certain fraudulent and
certain other practices 3 and establishes express civil, criminal and
injunctive remedies for violation of its provisions.' 4 In addition, sub-
section 21.20.430(1) of the Revised Code of Washington establishes a
private right of action for persons who buy securities from offerors or
sellers who use fraud or misstatements or who omit material facts. 5
9. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 131, 744 P.2d 1032, 1052 (1987).
10. Securities Act of Washington, ch. 282, 1959 Wash. Laws 1311 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 21.20 (1987)).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.140 (1987).
12. Id. § 21.20.040-.135.
13. Id. § 21.20.010-.030.
14. Id. § 21.20.390-.430.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987) also attaches liability for offering or selling
unregistered securities. In addition to the seller liability subsection, civil liability attaches to
certain nonsellers under section 21.20.430(2) (buyers who use fraud or misrepresentation) and
section 21.20.430(3) (specific categories of persons who have certain relationships with sellers or
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WSA was derived from the Uniform Securities Act, promulgated in
1956 by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association. 16 Rather than imitate the federal stat-
utory scheme, the drafters adopted some federal securities provi-
sions,17 discarded others,"8 and encouraged enacting states to treat
some Uniform Securities Act sections as "options."1 9 The Uniform
Securities Act's seller liability subsection20 was derived from section
12(2) of the federal Securities Act of 1933.2" The Washington legisla-
ture, discarding the Uniform Securities Act and federal section 12(2)
provisions for a good-faith defense, adopted the remainder of the Uni-
form Securities Act's seller liability subsection as subsection
buyers, including controlling persons and employees). Subsection 21.20.430(3) alone permits a
good-faith defense.
16. UNIFORM SEcuPrriEs ACT historical note, 7B U.L.A. 510, 514 (1985). The original
Uniform Securities Act text appears in L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITiES
ACT (1976) [hereinafter Loss COMMENTARY].
17. Compare UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7B U.L.A. 510, 516 (1985) (the source of the
general fraud provision in WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1987)) with Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1987); compare UNIFORM SECURTIES ACT § 410(b), 7B U.L.A. at 516 (the source
of the controlling person subsection of the civil liability provision in § 21.20.430(3)) with
Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20,
15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982) (separate provisions for controlling person liability).
18. For example, the Uniform Securities Act contains no equivalent to Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (issuer and professional liability for false
registration of securities).
19. Loss COMMENTARY, supra note 16, at 168-76 (three appendices suggesting optional
wordings); see also 7B U.L.A. 97-100 (Supp. 1987); 7B U.L.A. 510, 511-14 (1985) (noting that
all thirty-six enacting states have modified the Uniform Securities Act, with nearly all making
"numerous" changes); Rooks, The Blue Sky of Washington: Registration of Securities of a New
Venture, 6 GONz. L. REv. 187, 188 (1971).
20. UNIFORM SECURITIS ACT § 410(a)(2), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1985):
Any person who... offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not
knowing of the untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the untruth or
omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him ....
Loss COMMENTARY, supra note 16, at 145.
21. 7B U.L.A. 644 (1985). Section 12(2):
Any person who... offers or sells a security.., by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
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21.20.430(1) of the Revised Code of Washington.22 Since enacting the
seller liability statute, the legislature has amended it repeatedly,
although without substantively significant change and at least partly to
conform to nationwide trends.23
Who specifically might be deemed a "seller" under subsection
21.20.430(1), however, was not delineated by Washington courts
before Haberman. The few WSA seller liability cases dealt with face-
to-face selling conducted primarily by persons who actually held title
to the securities sold.24 The only notable exception was McClellan v.
Sundholm, 25 where a silver bullion salesman was held liable as a seller
even though, as an employee of the selling company, he did not per-
sonally pass title to the bullion.26 The salesman had directly
approached the buyer, described his employer's services and told the
buyer face-to-face that bullion was a sound investment.27 Although
the trial court found the salesman liable as a "controlling person, "28
the supreme court rejected that claim and concluded that the sales-
man, who did not "own" the bullion, "did in fact sell" it under subsec-
tion 21.20.430(1).29 The McClellan court's only expansion of "seller"
22. Securities Act of Washington, ch. 282, 1959 Wash. Laws 1344 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 21.20 (1987)).
23. See Act of Apr. 11, 1979, ch. 68, 1979 Wash. Laws 1196, 1223 (changing references to
male sellers to male or female sellers); Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 172, 1977 Wash. Laws 672, 678
(incorporating WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 violations); Act of May 16, 1975, ch. 84, 1975
Wash. Laws 354, 370 (increasing recoverable interest to eight percent); Act of Feb. 6, 1974, ch.
77, 1974 Wash. Laws 156, 165 (incorporating new subsection prohibiting certain contract-based
suits); Securities Act, ch. 199, 1967 Wash. Laws 999, 1003 (changing act to code references); cf
Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 179, 744 P.2d 1032, 1076 (1987) (Pearson, C.J.,
dissenting) (although legislature has amended section 21.20.430(1), the original language
requiring privity remains intact).
24. See Clausing v. DeHart, 83 Wash. 2d 70, 515 P.2d 982 (1973) (100% stockholders
negotiated nursing home sale face-to-face); Kittilson v. Ford, 23 Wash. App. 402, 595 P.2d 944
(1979), aff'd, 93 Wash. 2d 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980) (real estate contracts seller directly solicited
investment); Garretson v. Red-Co, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 923, 516 P.2d 1039 (1973) (closely-held
corporation solicited stock sale). The Haberman court, in its discussion of WSA seller liability,
also cited Golberg v. Sanglier, 27 Wash. App. 179, 616 P.2d 1239 (1980), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 874,
639 P.2d 1347 (1982), a buyer liability case analogous to the seller cases because facts were
misrepresented during a direct purchase. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 126, 744 P.2d at 1049; see
also Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (buyer who was managing officer and
majority stockholder misrepresented value of stock purchased directly from minority
stockholder), review denied, 78 Wash. 2d 994 (1970). Dicta in Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wash. App.
142, 149-51, 529 P.2d 23, 28-29 (1974) (participant liability claims in a common law fraud case)
noted that WSA civil liability for fraud attaches only to "face to face" negotiations and "direct
dealings."
25. 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 529, 574 P.2d at 372.
28. Id. at 533-34, 574 P.2d at 374.
29. Id. at 534, 574 P.2d at 374.
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was to include persons who engage in direct selling practices regard-
less of whether they personally pass title to the securities.
While Washington state courts had little opportunity to fully con-
strue the term "seller" prior to Haberman, federal courts in Washing-
ton, considering WSA seller liability claims in factual contexts
resembling Haberman, added confusion rather than insight with their
conflicting interpretations of state law. In two WPPSS-related opin-
ions, Judge Browning30 of the Western District of Washington said in
dicta that a securities issuer, although not an actual seller, could be
held liable as a seller under subsection 21.20.430(1). 31 Soon after
Judge Browning's comments, Judge Rothstein of the same court noted
that WSA liability for fraud could not attach to an issuer and its pro-
fessional consultant because they were not "connected with the innu-
merable persons who actually sold" the securities.32 Judge Rothstein
said that WSA liability attaches only to "those who bear some actual
'connection' to an offer or transaction, either as an offeror or offeree, a
seller or buyer, or someone involved indirectly as provided in RCW
§ 21.20.430(3)." 33 With Judge Rothstein's narrow interpretation sim-
ply counteracting Judge Browning's expansive reading, the meaning of
the term "seller" under WSA remained unresolved, awaiting clarifica-
tion by Washington state courts.
II. THE WPPSS BOND DEFAULT AND RESULTING
LITIGATION
In the 1950's and 1960's, experts predicted that hydroelectric sup-
plies would not meet the Pacific Northwest's power needs.34 The
Bonneville Power Administration, by 1972, succeeded in encouraging
WPPSS35 to plan the construction of three nuclear power projects.36
In 1976, WPPSS obtained the necessary financial commitments for
30. United States District Court Judge Browning of Tucson, Arizona, was assigned in 1985 to
hear the WPPSS cases in the Western District of Washington.
31. In re WPPSS, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 72,371, at 71,676
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 1986) (subsection 21.20.430(1) claims not at issue); Mirotznick v. Ernst &
Whinney, No. C85-1103, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 1986) (accountants not held liable as
subsection 21.20.430(1) sellers).
32. Naye v. Boyd, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 72,393, at 71,777
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 1986) (emphasis added) (Seafirst Corporation, its directors, officers and
independent auditor not held liable in stock transactions made while bank suffered huge financial
losses).
33. Id at 71,782.
34. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839, 841 (1983), cert denied, 469 U.S.
870 (1984).
35. WPPSS was formed under state law in 1957 as a municipal corporation and joint
operating agency to finance, construct, own and operate electrical generating facilities. Chemical
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two additional plants, Projects 4 and 5, when 88 utilities and munici-
palities signed "Participant Agreements."37  These "Participants"
agreed to pay the "'total annual cost of the Projects, including debt
services on the Bonds ... whether or not the Projects are operable or
operating.' "38 The next year, sales began in a $2.25 billion, fifteen-
part bond offering to finance the new plants.3 9 In 1982, after delays
and cost overruns made completion of Projects 4 and 5 financially
impossible," WPPSS terminated the plants, announcing that no more
bonds would be issued.41
To forestall the Participants' efforts at avoiding their bond payment
obligations,42 the WPPSS bond fund trustee, Chemical Bank, filed a
state court declaratory action to require payment.43 In Chemical
Bank I' and Chemical Bank , the Washington Supreme Court
held the agreements unenforceable because the Participant utilities
and municipalities lacked express or implied statutory authority to
enter into the Participant Agreements.46 Unable to secure repayment
under the agreements, bondholders filed suit in federal and state courts
against any entity that might be held responsible for the WPPSS bond
default.47
Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 776-77, 666 P.2d 329, 331 (1983), reconsidered and aff'd, 102
Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 1075 (1985).
36. Bonds guaranteed by the Bonneville Power Administration financed WPPSS Projects 1, 2
and 3. Id. at 772, 779, 666 P.2d at 332-33.
37. Asson, 670 P.2d at 843; DeFazio v. WPPSS, 296 Or. 550, 679 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984);.
The eighty-eight Participants included nine Washington cities, seven Oregon cities, five Idaho
cities, nineteen Washington public utility districts, four Oregon public utility districts, forty-three
rural electric cooperatives and one Washington irrigation district. Chemical Bank, 102 Wash. 2d
at 881 n.1, 691 P.2d at 529 n.1.
38. DeFazio, 679 P.2d at 1322 (quoting WPPSS Official Statement accompanying the bond
issuance).
39. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 114, 117, 744 P.2d 1032, 1043, 1044 (1987).
40. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 776, 666 P.2d 329, 331 (1983), reconsidered
and aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 1075 (1985).
41. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 117, 744 P.2d at 1044. See generally D. CHASAN, THE FALL
OF THE HOUSE OF WPPSS 49-55 (1985).
42. See generally DeFazio, 679 P.2d 1316 (the first WPPSS "ratepayers' revolt" case, filed in
December 1981, in which Oregon ratepayers challenged the validity of the Participation
Agreements); D. CHASAN, supra note 41, at 69-71.
43. Chemical Bank 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
44. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
45. Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1065, 1075 (1985).
46. Chemical Bank 99 Wash. 2d at 784-94, 666 P.2d at 335-40.
47. By late 1987, over 25,000 investors were involved in WPPSS lawsuits nationwide.
Gleckman, The Jury's Still Out on '"Whoops' - Way Out, Bus. WK. Nov. 2, 1987, at 168. Some
of the federal litigation was consolidated in the Western District of Washington, where it remains
pending. See In re WPPSS, 568 F. Supp. 1250 (J.P.M.D.L. 1983) (consolidating 13 WPPSS-
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III. THE HABERMAN DECISION
On May 7, 1984, Haberman v. WPPSS was filed in state court by a
group of individual WPPSS bondholders4" asserting violations of
WSA, the federal securities laws, and the Washington Consumer Pro-
tection Act, along with common law allegations of negligence, misrep-
resentation and fraud.49 Defendants were WPPSS, its twenty-three
member utilities and municipalities, the eighty-eight Participants and
professional consultants (attorneys, engineers, accountants and invest-
ment advisors). The professionals provided services in conjunction
with the preparation of "Official Statements" released by WPPSS to
underwriters,50 who used the Official Statements in selling the bonds
directly to investors.5'
Judge Carroll of the King County Superior Court dismissed the suit
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.52 The
Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review of the appeal and
reinstated plaintiffs' WSA claims and claims based on common law
theories of negligence, misrepresentation and fraud. 3 Claims under
section 12(2) of the federal Securities Act of 1933 were dismissed,
along with derivative claims of negligence and malpractice and claims
under the Washington Consumer Protection Act.54
WSA claims reinstated by the court included claims under the seller
liability and controlling person liability provisions.5 5 The court, how-
related actions in the Western District of Washington and the Southern District of New York for
pretrial proceedings).
48. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 118, 744 P.2d 1032, 1045 (1987). Subsequently,
two groups of institutional investors intervened as additional plaintiffs. Id Intervenors included:
One, five subsidiaries of American Express, holding $90 million in WPPSS bonds; and two,
United States Trust Company, trustee of investment funds holding $270 million in WPPSS
bonds. First Amended Complaint in Intervention of American Express Company Subsidiaries
and Restated Demand for Jury Trial at 10-12, Haberman v. WPPSS (King County Super. Ct.
Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-8); First Amended Complaint in Intervention of United States
Trust Company of New York, Trustee[] and Restated Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Haberman v.
WPPSS (King County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-8).
49. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 119, 744 P.2d at 1045-46.
50. Id. at 116, 118, 744 P.2d at 1044, 1045. The Official Statements were written by WPPSS
and its investment advisors. They included legal opinions of bond counsel that Participants were
obligated to pay the projects' costs regardless of plant completion or operation. Opinions of
engineers and accountants regarding the structural and financial feasibility of the projects were
also included in the statements. Id
51. Id at 117, 744 P.2d at 1044.
52. Haberman v. WPPSS, No. 84-2-06452-8 (King County Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 1985).
53. Habernan, 109 Wash. 2d at 119, 744 P.2d at 1046.
54. Id
55. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.430(l), (3) (1987).
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ever, declined to address claims under WSA's general fraud provision,
despite the availability of cumulative remedies under WSA.5 6
A. New "Forces" Unleashed in the Field of Seller Liability
The most far-reaching ruling by the Haberman court was the deci-
sion on seller liability under WSA subsection 21.20.430(1). In allowing
claims against issuer WPPSS and its professional consultants, Justice
Brachtenbach wrote for the majority:
[A] defendant is liable as a seller under RCW 21.20.430(1) if his acts
were a substantial contributive factor in the sales transaction. Considera-
tions important in determining whether a defendant's conduct is a sub-
stantial contributive factor in the sales transaction include: (1) the
number of other factors which contribute to the sale and the extent of
the effect which they have in producing it; (2) whether the defendant's
conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous
and active operation up to the time of the sale, or has created a situation
harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not
responsible; and (3) lapse of time .... Whether a defendant's conduct
was a substantial contributive factor is necessarily a question of fact.57
The majority developed four rationales for adopting a substantial
contributive factor test.58 First, the express language of section
21.20.900 and prior case law required that any interpretation of WSA
be in harmony with interpretations of analogous federal and state pro-
visions.59 Harmony, according to the majority, would be furthered by
adopting a substantial contributive factor test for WSA seller liabil-
56. Id. § 21.20.010. The court also rejected an argument that WSA should not be applied to
out-of-state defendants or transactions. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 134, 744 P.2d at 1053.
Further, the court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of section 21.20.430(7), which
lowers the standard of culpability for certain persons who materially aid in the offer or sale of
certain government-issued securities. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 136-47, 744 P.2d at 1054-60.
57. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 131-32, 744 P.2d at 1052 (emphasis added).
58. The court refers to both a "substantial contributive factor" test and a "substantial factor-
proximate cause" test. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 128-33, 744 P.2d at 1050-52. Although the
Haberman court uses the terms interchangeably, many courts have taken slightly varying
approaches when applying the tests. For a comparison of cases emphasizing the participation
element with cases stressing proximate cause and cases focusing on the "position" of the
defendant, see O'Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933: the Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REv. 921, 946-79 (1984); see also
Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability Under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 1982
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 529, 532-50; Comment, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933: A Proximate Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 361, 367-76 (1983).
59. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 125, 744 P.2d at 1049.
Vol. 63:769, 1988
Expanding Seller Liability
ity.' Second, the Official Comments to revised Uniform Securities
Act section 605(a) supported a substantial contributive factor test.61
Third, the court's adoption of the test was "in harmony with similar
developments in general tort law.' 62 Finally, the majority, noting that
WSA does not address issuer liability, explained that WSA's "clear
purposes" required as a matter of policy the expansion of seller
liability.63
The dissent,64 favoring dismissal of WSA claims and certain negli-
gent misrepresentation claims, emphasized that WSA's "clear lan-
guage" requires privity between plaintiff and defendant. 6 The dissent
argued that the majority's use of revised Uniform Securities Act com-
ments was "without merit,",66 and that the use of tort principles to
construe statutory law was "inappropriate." 67 The majority's inter-
pretation of WSA mirroring the interpretation of federal securities
acts was "improper," according to the dissent, because of the acts'
sharply differing purposes and statutory schemes. 68 The substantial
participant test for seller liability used by other courts did not encom-
pass persons who were "merely involved in preparing reports and
offering circulars. ' 69 Other state courts, the dissent continued, have
not interpreted state securities acts in an "inconclusive" manner, as
60. Id. at 126-29, 744 P.2d at 1049-51. The majority based this decision on its view that a
majority of federal circuits interpreting seller liability under section 12(2) of the federal Securities
Act of 1933 used a substantial factor test.
61. Acknowledging that the revised Uniform Securities Act had not been enacted by the
Washington legislature, the majority stated nonetheless that "this approach best promotes the
legislative purpose behind the [WSA]." Id. at 130, 744 P.2d at 1051.
62. Id. (citing Davis v. AVCO Fin. Services, Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1005, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985), a Sixth Circuit case that took language
directly from RES.ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 432, 433 (1965) to formulate a substantial
contributive factor test).
63. Id. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.
64. Chief Justice Pearson wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Dolliver and Andersen.
The majority comprised Justices Brachtenbach, Utter, Dore, Goodloe and Durham and Judge
Wetherall of the King County Superior Court, who sat pro tempore. Justice Callow took no part
in the opinion. See id. at 178, 190, 744 P.2d at 1076, 1082.
65. Id. at 179, 744 P.2d at 1076.
66. Id. at 180, 744 P.2d at 1077. "Our Legislature has not espoused that act and its
comments in any part; indeed, only two states have adopted the act, and then with numerous
variations. Whether other states will adopt the act is not only speculative but improbable,
because both the American Bar Association and the North American Securities Administrators
Association criticized and refused to endorse it." Id, at 180-81, 744 P.2d at 1077 (citations
omitted).
67. Id. at 181, 744 P.2d at 1077 ("In fact, the securities laws were created specifically to
regulate a unique aspect of commerce that no other area of law touches upon, including common
law tort.").
68. Id. at 181, 182, 744 P.2d at 1077, 1078.
69. Id at 183, 744 P.2d at 1078.
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suggested by the majority, but rather "according to their plain lan-
guage."' 70 The dissent noted that federal courts not mirroring section
12(2) interpretations "generally employ a plain meaning interpreta-
tion" of state securities acts.7 '
B. The Result Sought by the Court vs. the Result Achieved
Although a lengthy portion of the Haberman opinion is devoted to
the seller liability issue,72 only a single paragraph discussed applica-
tion of the court's new test to the Haberman defendants. 73 That brief
discussion stated that issuers, such as WPPSS, should not escape lia-
bility by selling to "middlemen beyond their control" in a firm com-
mitment underwriting.74 Acknowledging the lack of separate issuer
liability under WSA, the majority reinstated seller liability claims
against issuer WPPSS.75
In extending seller liability to WPPSS, however, other liabilities not
discussed in the opinion resulted. The majority opinion included a
single, oblique reference to "others acting together with the issuer who
were the actual beneficiaries of the sales proceeds." '76  Without
explaining its reasoning or outlining the new scope of WSA seller lia-
bility, the majority then reinstated all WSA seller liability claims
against all defendants. While an argument might be made that the
WPPSS members and Participants were "actual beneficiaries of the
sale proceeds," professional consultants, whose service fees were not
contingent on the bond offering's success, were simply not benefi-
ciaries. The court did not identify any specific actions by the profes-
sionals that might incur seller liability. Furthermore, the court did not
expressly acknowledge that its expansive reading of the seller liability
statute could potentially be used to attach liability not only to issuers
70. Id. at 184, 744 P.2d at 1078.
71. Id. at 186, 744 P.2d at 1079.
72. Id. at 124-33, 744 P.2d at 1048-52.
73. Id. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.
74. Id. "Firm commitment underwriting," the most common underwriting method in the
United States, occurs when an issuer sells securities to underwriters (for example, investment
bankers) who then resell to investors. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 83-90 (1983) [hereinafter Loss FUNDAMENTALS]. Following industry practice,
WPPSS sold the bonds to underwriters who sold them to the Haberman plaintiffs. Haberman,
109 Wash. 2d at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.
75. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 132-33, 744 P.2d at 1052.
76. Id. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052 ("If we were to require strict privity for liability under RCW
21.20.430(1), only the underwriters would be potentially liable for prospectus fraud, cutting off
all potential claims against the issuer of the bonds and others acting together with the issuer who
were the actual beneficiaries of the sale proceeds ") (emphasis added).
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but also to professionals who have little or no involvement in the sell-
ing process.
Because the Haberman decision was result-oriented, it seems fair to
consider the final result if the case were litigated to its conclusion and
all defendants found liable. Plaintiffs would then seek payment of the
judgment award. WPPSS demonstrated its inability to pay bondhold-
ers before the lawsuit began, and the WPPSS members and Partici-
pants are small local utilities lacking surplus funds. As a result, the
professionals, backed by insurance policies," might be forced to pay
the bulk of any judgment award. If the "deep pocket" among the
Haberman defendants is worn, not by WPPSS, but by the outside pro-
fessionals, a serious question is raised by the court's result-oriented
decision: Was seller liability in Washington expanded not merely to
allow claims against an issuer but to allow bond buyers the right to
seek damages from anyone marginally involved in the transaction who
might be financially capable of "substantially contributing" to the pay-
ment of judgment awards?
C. Increased Uncertainty in the Defense of Seller Liability Claims
Although future unhappy securities buyers were assisted by the
Haberman court's expansion of seller liability, professional consultants
were left uncertain about what specific actions might subject them to
liability. The majority opinion creates new black-letter law in the area
of seller liability without applying that law to the Haberman facts to
indicate which of the defendants' actions were "substantial contribu-
tive factors" sufficient to invoke seller liability. Rather than giving a
clear, practical definition of its new seller liability test, the court sim-
ply announced "considerations" that would be "important" in apply-
ing the test.73
These "considerations" were borrowed, almost verbatim, from com-
mon law tort principles on legal causation found in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.79 The central "consideration" is whether the
77. For example, WPPSS bond counsel Houghton, Cluck, Coughlin & Riley (a Haberman
defendant) reached a $7.25 million settlement with bondholders in federal litigation in the
Western District of Washington. In reporting the settlement, the Seattle Times noted that the
amount was believed to be the maximum limit available under the law firm's insurance policy.
Seattle Times, Dec. 25, 1987, at C14, col. 1.
78. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 131, 744 P.2d at 1052.
79. Compare supra text accompanying note 57 (text of Haberman court's substantial
contributive factor test) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 432, 433 (1965). See also
Davis v. AVCO Fin. Services, Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1063-68 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1005, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985). But see Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (questioning the pertinence of common law doctrines in applying
779
Washington Law Review
defendant's conduct creates a "force or series of forces" that are in
"continuous and active operation" up to the time of the sale, or creates
a "situation harmless" unless acted upon by other forces for which the
actor is not responsible.8" These quoted phrases lack obvious meanings
in the context of Washington's securities laws.81 Because the Haber-
man court offered no explanation, Washington courts will be required
to further interpret the new test for seller liability.
IV. FACTORS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO
AN EXPANSION OF SELLER LIABILITY
The majority suggested that the primary reason for expanding seller
liability was to reach a "result" whereby issuer WPPSS could be found
liable.82 In failing to consider fully the policy ramifications of its deci-
sion, the court effectively adopted a statutory scheme never considered
by the Washington legislature.
The new test for seller liability expands the strict privity approach
to include "those parties who have the attributes of a seller and thus
who policy dictates should be subject to liability under RCW
§ 21.20.430(l)."" 3 The majority does not specify what policy dictates
this result except that the "clear purposes" of WSA84 are "to protect
investors."85 The statute, presumably written to reflect those "clear
purposes," expressly holds a seller liable only "to the person buying
the security from him or her."86 Imposition of liability for setting in
motion "forces which are in continuous and active operation"87 until
the moment a sale occurs was accomplished by the court, not by the
statute.88 If courts expand seller liability statutes merely because a
plaintiff invokes the phrase "investors must be protected," the invest-
ment marketplace will be severely disrupted.89 The market cannot
securities statutes); Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 181, 744 P.2d at 1077 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting)
(majority's argument based on tort principles is misplaced because question is one of statutory
construction).
80. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 131, 744 P.2d at 1052.
81. "[I]n matters of literary style the sovereign virtue for the judge is clearness" Cardozo,
Nourishing our Power of Clear Statement, in THE GREAT POWER AT THE BAR AND BENCH 1142
(J. Rivera ed. 1972) (emphasis added).
82. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.
83. Id. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 125, 744 P.2d at 1049.
86. WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
87. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 131, 744 P.2d at 1052.
88. Id. at 132, 744 P.2d at 1052.
89. In re WPPSS, MDL No. 551 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 1987), in which Judge Browning
dismissed "with considerable personal reluctance" all claims against the Bonneville Power
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offer money-back guarantees to investors who demand that all securi-
ties be risk-free. 90 Investors should be protected by the securities laws,
but a policy of protection does not and should not afford to investors
automatic legal immunity for their own bad investment decisions.91
A. Misunderstanding of Federal and State Securities Statutes
In Haberman, the majority contended that WSA section 21.20.900
requires "harmony" between WSA and federal and other states' seller
liability laws. 92 By citing section 21.20.900 as requiring harmoniza-
tion, the court effectively avoided an accurate or in-depth discussion of
the federal statutes and case law.
The Haberman court, turning to section 12(2) of the federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933 for guidance, noted that the WSA seller liability sub-
section was "modeled after" the Uniform Securities Act, which was
"modeled after" section 12(2). Subsection 21.20.430(1) is a direct
descendant but not a clone of section 12(2). 91 Perhaps the biggest dif-
ference between the two statutes lies in the state subsection's lack of a
good-faith defense as found in the federal section.94 But in addition to
this and other obvious wording differences,95 the two statutes were
Administration ("BPA"). In realizing that the BPA was absolved of liability because it fell
under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1982), Judge Browning did not attempt to reinterpret the statute just to hold the BPA liable.
Instead, he wrote: "While this Court is powerless to address those concerns, the Congress is not.
Fundamental fairness and elementary principles of accountability demand that Congress address
these charges and, if substantiated, provide relief through private legislation or otherwise."
WPPSS, at 18-19.
90. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933); H. CHERRINGTON, THE INVESTOR
AND THE SECURITIES ACr 246 (1973).
91. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his message to Congress recommending passage of
the Securities Act of 1933, wrote, "The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public
with the least possible interference to honest business" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1933) (emphasis added).
92. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 125, 744 P.2d at 1049; cf Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash. 2d 223,
227, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (1980) ("The coordination of the federal courts with federal regulations
does not require imitation by this court in construing our act, only that our construction not
interfere with the federal scheme."). Not all courts share the Washington Supreme Court's
predilection for statutory uniformity. In Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.
1982), the Ninth Circuit reviewed section 12(2) seller liability along with a seller liability claim
under a California statute virtually identical to section 21.20.430(1) and held that liability was
available under the federal, but not the state, statute. Id. at 1295, 1296.
93. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 125, 744 P.2d at 1048; see also UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
§ 410 comment, 7B U.L.A. 644 (1985).
94. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
95. Compare supra note 5 (text of WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987)) with supra note
21 (text of federal section 12(2)).
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enacted for different purposes96 and fit into different statutory
schemes.9 7
Section 12(2) was part of a federal act written with the philosophy
that the best way to protect investors was to force disclosure of all
financial information relevant to securities and securities transac-
tions.98 The theory was that, with the necessary information in hand,
investors could make the best decisions regarding their own invest-
ments.9 9 WSA section 21.20.430, however, was enacted as part of a
state securities act intended not only to force disclosure but also to
regulate the merit of securities being sold.'O°
Section 12(2) is part of a statutory scheme that takes an entirely
different approach to who can be held liable for securities violations
than does WSA. For example, section 3 of the Securities Act of 1933
expressly exempts municipal bonds from its coverage,'°' but WSA has
no parallel provision.10 2 Further, section 11 of the federal act provides
express civil liability for issuers, professional consultants and under-
writers involved in preparation of registration statements that misrep-
resent or omit material facts.'0 3  WSA contains no equivalent to
section 11 but augments its seller liability section"° with subsections
allowing buyer liability"°5 and providing liability for persons who con-
trol or who have specified relationships with the seller/buyer.10 6 The
96. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 181, 744 P.2d at 1077 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 182, 744 P.2d at 1077 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting). See generally O'Hara, supra note
58, at 925 & n.13, 994-1001.
98. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
99. See H. CHERRINGTON, supra note 90, at 238.
100. See Naye v. Boyd, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 72,393, at
77,781 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 1986); Rooks, supra note 19, at 188; Comment, Securities Fraud
Under the Blue Sky of Washington, 53 WASH. L. REV. 279, 282 n.10 (1978). See generally Loss
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 74, at 29-38 (discussing the differences between and historical bases
for merit and disclosure philosophies of securities regulation).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982); see also Davidson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp.
494, 495 (D. Colo. 1979); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 767 (D. Colo.
1964).
102. The Haberman court, noting that the WPPSS bonds "remain exempt from section 12(2)
liability," affirmed dismissal of federal section 12(2) claims. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d
107, 124, 744 P.2d 1032, 1048 (1987).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987).
105. Id. § 21.20.430(2).
106. Id. § 21.20.430(3); see also Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis & McCormick, [1986-87
Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 72,480, at 72,781 (W.D. Wash. Aug 11, 1986)
(dismissing WSA seller liability claims against local counsel in a WPPSS-related case who
provided opinion letters to various Participants because WSA "limits those liable to certain
categories of persons" specified in subsections 21.20.430(1) and 21.20.430(3)).
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Securities Act of 1933 contains no statute identical to the WSA sub-
section, although it does provide for "controlling person" liability.1"7
Perhaps the Haberman court saw the state statutory scheme as lack-
ing the sophisticated provisions found in the federal act, such as the
section providing express issuer and professional liability. The major-
ity may have felt compelled to stretch the seller liability subsection to
overcome perceived deficiencies in WSA. Such an impulse, although
possibly misplaced, would be understandable, but the opinion offered
no such rationale. Instead, the court analogized subsection
21.20.430(1) to federal section 12(2) simply because both shared a
common origin and contained some identical language. As the dissent
noted, however, "[o]nly a strict privity approach ensures meaningful
application of all portions of, section .430." '18
B. Misapplication of Federal Case Law
The Haberman court adopted its substantial contributive factor test
from seller liability tests used by other jurisdictions without analyzing
how other courts have actually applied their tests. The court, noting
that only two federal circuits require privity between buyer and seller
in federal section 12(2) cases, opted for the viewpoint of the majority
of circuits, which requires "participation in the sale [that is] a substan-
tial factor in causing the transaction to take place." 109 However, the
court failed to recognize that the "split" in the federal circuits is more
form than substance; the courts differ not in what they do, but merely
in how they describe what they do.
Whether federal courts approach the matter as strict construction-
ists, as substantial participant or substantial contributive factor propo-
nents, the results are the same. Seller liability is found almost
exclusively where actual title passes from "seller" to buyer or where
the "seller" plays an active, personal role in face-to-face negotiations
or solicitations leading directly to a specific sales transaction. 110
The Ninth Circuit first applied a "substantial factor" test for seller
liability in SEC v. Murphy. "' The Murphy court held a corporate
officer of a cable TV financing venture liable under section 12 because
his acts were "both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
108. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 180, 744 P.2d 1032, 1076 (1987) (emphasis
added).
109. Id. at 126, 127, 130, 744 P.2d at 1049, 1051.
110. Cf 1d. at 183, 744 P.2d at 1078 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
111. 626 F.2d 633, 652 (9th Cir. 1980).
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transaction."' 2 The officer had met personally with investors and
their representatives."1 3
The Fifth Circuit took an early lead 1 4 in expanding section 12(2)
liability but, like the Ninth Circuit, has consistently found liability
only where defendants have direct involvement with buyers or own
title to the security being sold.' 5 The remaining circuits, whether
112. Id. at 650.
113. Id. at 652; see also Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1985) (Murphy test
applicable to determine whether two stockholders were section 12(2) "sellers"); Admiralty Fund
v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (Murphy test applicable to determine whether
corporation's attorney, present at all meetings with the buyer, was a section 12(2) seller);
McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 581 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (substantial participant test
applicable to determine section 12(2) liability of stock issuer and issuer's president).
For cases in which no liability was found under the substantial factor test, see, e.g., In re
Victor Technologies Sec. Litig., [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. 72,491 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 8, 1987) (defendant examined and prepared financial statements included in stock
registration statement and prospectus); Fine v. Rubin, 623 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(defendants drafted stock registration statement and prospectus, dealing only with underwriters);
In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (issuer and its officers and
directors set stock prices, negotiated underwriting agreement, helped in presentations to brokers
and analysts, etc.); In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 604 F. Supp. 150, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (issuer
prepared registration statement but was not directly involved in the "particular sales transaction
to the particular plaintiff") (emphasis in original); In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 447
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (issuer's officers and directors prepared stock registration statement and
arranged financing but did not play substantial role in sales process); Hudson v. Capital
Management Int'l, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,222 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 24, 1982) (attorneys and accountants prepared opinions in offering statements but did not
participate in selling process). But see In re Wickes Companies, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1982-83
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,056 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1983) (section 12(2)
participant liability claim could be stated against accountants who prepared financial statements
used in offering materials).
114. As early as 1940, the First Circuit expanded section 12(2) liability to include not only
sellers in privity with buyers but also stock brokers soliciting sales transactions on behalf of
others. Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). See generally
O'Hara, supra note 58, at 933-46. No significantly broader expansion occurred until Lennerth v.
Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964), in which a stock seller's agent, who met
personally with buyers to solicit sales, was held liable as a seller for "proximately" causing the
transactions. The Fifth Circuit subsequently adopted the Lennerth proximate-cause test in Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
115. In an early case applying a substantial factor test, the Fifth Circuit expanded section
12(2) liability to include franchise promoters who had no direct involvement in actual sales
transactions but who were "the motivating force" behind the sale. Hill York 448 F.2d at 693.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases, however, have been less expansive, with liability attaching only
where defendants are directly involved in sales transactions. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d
1349 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney who actively negotiated merger transaction held liable as seller);
Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney who gave negligent tax advice to
investors not held liable as seller because advice was not a substantial factor in investment
decision); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980) (major stockholder did not play
substantial role in sales of stock to other investors prior to anticipated public offering). See
generally O'Hara, supra note 58, at 961-74; Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the
Securities Act: When Is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 445 (1977).
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adopting the rhetoric of substantial participation" 6 or of traditional
strict privity, 117 have similarly found liability only where the defend-
ants were involved in a face-to-face selling process with buyers or
where the defendants passed title.'
If the Haberman court had looked more closely at the facts in the
federal cases, the court would have realized that WSA seller liability
claims against WPPSS, its members, the Participants and the profes-
sional consultants should have been dismissed. Federal case law
would mandate dismissal unless actual title passed from WPPSS or the
other defendants or unless they played active, personal roles in face-to-
face negotiations or solicitations leading directly to the specific sales
transactions. In Haberman, only the underwriters passed title. No
claims of personal, face-to-face involvement were asserted against any
defendants. 19
In addition to incorrectly interpreting federal case law, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court also acted prematurely. The Haberman court
recognized that the United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the "split" in the federal circuits on section 12(2) seller liability.' 20
116. See, ag., Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1985) (underwriter
who did not directly communicate with buyer and who made only one comment to buyer's
accountant regarding parties to transaction not held liable as seller), modified on other grounds,
782 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Avco Fin. Services, Inc., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984)
(finance company manager who, in face-to-face transactions, loaned money to finance pyramid
scheme investments held liable as seller), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1005, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012
(1985); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981) (attorney who rendered opinion to
auditor whose audit report was included in materials advertising sale of precious metals not held
liable as seller); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978) (broker who actively solicited
stock orders held liable as section 12(1) seller); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d
Cir. 1969) (brokerage firm and attorney could be held liable for actively soliciting stock sales); In
re WICAT Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Utah 1984) (issuer in firm commitment
underwriting not held liable as seller).
117. See, eg., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (firm
commitment underwriter that owned stock sold to plaintiff held liable as seller), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979) (issuer in firm
commitment underwriting not held liable as seller); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F.
Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (broker who sold common stock and accounting firm that audited
issuer's financial statements not held liable as sellers because neither passed title).
118. "In each of the cases the parties have cited to this Court [in urging application of the
substantial factor test], substantial participation has been found only where the defendant has
engaged in [a] high degree of individual effort to sell the security and usually has been in actual
contact with the plaintiff." In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 604 F. Supp. 150, 161 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(emphasis added).
119. See First Amended Complaint in Intervention of American Express Company
Subsidiaries and Restated Demand for Jury Trial, Haberman v. WPPSS (King County Super. Ct.
Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-8); First Amended Complaint in Intervention of United States
Trust Company of New York, Trustee[,] and Restated Demand for Jury Trial, Haberman v.
WPPSS (King County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-8).
120. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 127, 744 P.2d 1032, 1050 (1987).
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Yet the court ignored the fact that the federal substantial factor test is
certain to obtain United States Supreme Court review shortly.121
Given the Supreme Court's recent history of using a strict statutory
construction approach to limit liability,122 the Washington court may
be forced to reconsider its views soon.
C. Inconclusiveness of Other States' Laws
Although the Haberman court used federal case law in its analysis,
the court acknowledged the futility of drawing any parallels from
other states' laws. Other states' decisions were "inconclusive,"
according to the court, and federal courts' interpretations of other
states' statutes reflected a "federal analysis of section 12(2) as applied
to the state law in question" rather than state court analysis.
123
Although the court emphasized earlier in the Haberman opinion the
goal of uniformity with other states' laws, it recognized that the laws
of other states displayed a remarkable lack of uniformity.124
The diverse interpretations of state seller liability laws exist not only
because state courts have interpreted similar statutes differently, 125 but
also because of significant variation in the express language and con-
struction of state statutes.' 26 Even in states adopting the Uniform
Securities Act, state legislatures have freely modified the Uniform
121. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, reh'g denied, 794 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987). Although considering section 12(1) rather than section 12(2), the Fifth
Circuit in Dahl appended a new requirement to its test for seller liability: Not only must the
alleged seller have been a substantial factor in the sales transaction, but the seller must also have
"received or hoped to receive some financial benefit from his efforts." Id. at 990. On April 20,
1987, the Supreme Court agreed to review Dahl. 107 S. Ct. 1885.
122. See Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) ("the broad
reading of 'seller' may be in some doubt in light of recent Supreme Court cases that prescribe a
strict statutory construction approach to the securities acts and reject their expansion with tort
and criminal theories"); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); SEC
v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978); O'Hara, supra note 58, at 924-25 & n.12, 986, 987-1001. But
see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383, 386-87 (1983).
123. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 129, 744 P.2d at 1050, 1051.
124. 1d. at 129, 744 P.2d at 1050. The dissent argued that other courts' interpretations of
state securities acts were not "inconclusive" but generally construed state statutes strictly in
accordance with their plain language. Id. at 184, 744 P.2d at 1078 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 129, 744 P.2d at 1050. As the Haberman court noted, the only two state courts
construing statutes similar to WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(1) (1987) have taken opposite
approaches. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 129, 744 P.2d at 1050. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
refused to extend state seller liability to participants in Nikkel v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 542 P.2d
1305 (Okla. 1975). The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted the Eighth Circuit's substantial
factor test for state seller liability in Anders v. Dakota Land & Dev. Co., 380 N.W.2d 862 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
126. " 'Language within a statute must be read in context with the entire statute and
construed in a manner consistent with the general purposes of the statute.' " Chemical Bank v.
WPPSS, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 782, 666 P.2d 329 (1983) (quoting Nationwide Papers, Inc. v.
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Securities Act upon adoption and amended it later.127 As a result,
some state statutes provide express liability for underwriters who par-
ticipate in sales transactions, 28 and some hold accountants, engineers
and other professionals involved in sales transactions liable.129 Others
extend liability to participants or those who materially aid in a sale130
and still others demand strict privity between buyer and seller.
13
D. The Pretense of "Uniformity" Among Securities Laws
One rationale for the Haberman court's adoption of a substantial
contributive factor test was the need for uniformity between Washing-
ton law and the laws of federal and other state jurisdictions. 32 While
many state and federal securities laws assert that uniformity is
needed, 133 Washington, like other states, has ignored this goal by
repeatedly revising WSA.'3 Even minor changes in form moved the
Washington statutes slightly further away from strict uniformity with
the Uniform Securities Act. When the Haberman court used "uni-
formity" to support its argument that WSA seller liability should be
interpreted similarly to other state courts' interpretations of other
states' Uniform Securities Act-derived statutes, the court ignored the
legislature's demonstrated rejection of absolute strict "uniformity."
Another flaw in the court's rationale for adopting a substantial con-
tributive factor test is its use of the Official Comments to the 1985
revised Uniform Securities Act.135  The Washington legislature
adopted neither the Official Comments accompanying the original
Uniform Securities Act'36 nor the revised Uniform Securities Act and
Northwest Egg Sales, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 72, 76, 416 P.2d 687, 689 (1966)), reconsidered and
aff'd, 102 Wash. 2d 874, 691 P.2d 524 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 1075 (1985).
127. See supra note 19.
128. See, eg., Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(Illinois statute).
129. See, eg., Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 846 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (California statute).
130. See, eg., Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 213 (D.
Me. 1984) (Maine statute); Crane v. Courtright, 2 Ohio App. 2d 125, 206 N.E.2d 913 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1964) (Ohio statute); Fakhrdai v. Mason, 72 Or. App. 681, 696 P.2d 1164 (Or. Ct. App.),
review denied, 299 Or. 314, 702 P.2d 1111 (1985) (Oregon statute).
131. See, eg., In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (Georgia statute); Ging v. Parker-Hunter, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(Pennsylvania statute).
132. Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 125, 744 P.2d 1032, 1048-49 (1987) (citing
Wash. Rev. Code § 21.20.900 (1987)).
133. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.900 (1987).
134. See supra note 23 and accompanying discussion.
135. 7B U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1987).
136. Securities Act of Washington, ch. 282, 1959 Wash. Laws 1311 (codified at WAsH. REV.
CODE § 21.20 (1987)).
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Official Comments as promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 13 7 Yet the Haberman court
turned to official comments appended to the revised act for additional
authority to support its adoption of a substantial contributive factor
test. The official comment to section 605(a) of the revised Uniform
Securities Act would extend seller liability to a person whose partici-
pation is a substantial contributive factor in violating the act's provi-
sions. 13  Stating that "this approach best promotes the legislative
purpose behind the [WSA]," 13 9 the court effectively usurped legislative
authority by "adopting" part of a proposed statute not yet considered
by the legislature itself.
V. PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY SELLER LIABILITY LAW
IN WASHINGTON
The trial court in Haberman properly dismissed all WSA seller lia-
bility claims against all defendants. The supreme court, in reversing
the lower court's decision, 1" incorrectly broadened WSA's scope to
include parties, other than direct sellers, who are substantial contribu-
tive factors in sales transactions. Until the legislature corrects the
Haberman mistake or the court modifies its position, other courts and
litigants should dissect the Haberman opinion to understand that the
opinion's thrust was toward holding a specific issuer, WPPSS, liable.
Fairness to both investors and professional consultants requires that
the substantial contributive factor test for seller liability be applied in
the same manner that other courts have applied it. Only where privity
between buyer and seller exists or where active, face-to-face "partici-
pation" in the selling process occurs should liability attach.
137. See Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 180, 744 P.2d 1032, 1077 (1987) (Pearson,
C.J., dissenting); 7B U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1987).
138. 7B U.L.A. 81 (Supp. 1987).
139. Haberman, 109 Wash. 2d at 130, 744 P.2d at 1051.
140. If the intervenors' complaints had supported certain allegations in their briefs on the
motion to dismiss, the Washington Supreme Court could have reinstated seller liability claims
without broadening WSA's scope. Intervenors' briefs contended that WPPSS and the other
defendants made direct sales presentations to some of the complaining parties during tours of
WPPSS facilities in the Pacific Northwest and meetings in New York prior to issuance of the
bonds. Brief of Appellants American Express Company Subsidiaries and United States Trust
Company at 15-16, Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash. 2d 107, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987) (No. 52559-
5). No such claims, however, were made in the underlying complaints. See First Amended
Complaint in Intervention of American Express Company Subsidiaries and Restated Demand
for Jury Trial, Haberman v. WPPSS (King County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-
8); First Amended Complaint in Intervention of United States Trust Company of New York,
Trustee[,] and Restated Demand for Jury Trial, Haberman v. WPPSS (King County Super. Ct.
Mar. 29, 1985) (No. 84-2-06452-8).
Expanding Seller Liability
A clearer definition of "substantial contributive factor" would
enhance the predictability of judgments on the issue of WSA seller
liability. Adoption by Washington courts of federal court language
that a defendant is a substantial factor "if he or she 'actively solicits an
order, participates in the negotiations, or arranges the sale' "141 would
clarify the scope of the Habennan substantial contributive factor test.
The Washington legislature needs to clarify subsection 21.20.430(1)
by an amendment 42 as follows:
Any person, who offers or sells a security in violation of any provi-
sions of RCW 21.20.010 or 21.20.140 through 21.20.230, is liable to the
person buying the security from him or her. Liability attaches under this
subsection only (a) to a seller who has passed actual title to the security to
the buyer or (b) to any person who has played an active, personal role in
face-to-face negotiations or solicitations leading directly to the specific
sales transaction at issue The buyer under this subsection may sue ....
The proposed new second sentence in subsection 21.20.430(1)
would align Washington with the actual holdings of courts interpret-
ing similar statutes. By specifying that direct contact must occur, it
would aid professionals and other potential defendants in assessing the
likelihood that their acts might incur seller liability in Washington,
and it would avoid unwitting and innocent exposure to such liability
by professionals in the ordinary course of their business.'43
The legislature could also adopt a new provision holding an issuer
liable for misrepresentations or omissions of material fact contained in
registration statements or offering materials prepared by the issuer.
Such liability could extend to all issuers, including issuers, like
WPPSS, who sell securities via firm-commitment underwritings.
Legislative action such as this would send a clear message to the
courts that, where liability is not available under revised WSA sections
regarding seller/offeror, buyer or issuer provisions, liability properly
141. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 421 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Lawler v.
Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1288 (4th Cir. 1978)); see also Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59,
65 (N.D. Ohio 1964) ("liability must lie somewhere between the narrow view, which holds only
the parties to the sale, and the too-liberal view which would hold all who remotely participated in
the events leading up to the transaction").
142. In amending WSA, the legislature should not blindly mimic the federal securities
statutes. Rather, it should heed its own words in WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.900 (1987) and
"coordinate" with the federal scheme, not duplicate it.
143. Attention should be paid to the official draftsmen's commentary to the Uniform
Securities Act's seller liability subsection: "Civil liability is an essential adjunct to a blue sky law.
But by the same token it should be sufficiently precise... so that honest people will not be given
the difficult choice of staying out of a state or subjecting themselves to uncertain and possibly
ruinous liabilities." Loss COMMENTARY, supra note 16, at 146.
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attaches only to the categories of persons specified under section
430(3).
VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Haberman v. WPPSS
left seller liability law under the Securities Act of Washington in a
state of disarray. Clearly, the decision expands seller liability. Less
clear is the scope of that expansion. In reaching a result-oriented deci-
sion aimed at holding a specific bond issuer, WPPSS, liable as a seller,
the court borrowed from federal law a "substantial contributive fac-
tor" test for seller liability. However, the court ignored the fact that
other courts applying a substantial contributive factor test impose lia-
bility almost exclusively where defendants are directly involved in the
sales process or pass title to the securities sold. By using the test to
reinstate seller claims against not only issuer WPPSS but also against
professional consultants who neither owned the bonds nor were
directly involved in the sales, the Haberman court stretched seller lia-
bility law into previously uncharted territory. Yet rather than indicat-
ing specifically which of the professional consultants' acts made them
vulnerable to seller claims, the court propounded vague "considera-
tions" for determining liability that will require additional interpreta-
tion by future courts to gain practical meaning.
Professional consultants, issuers, investors and all others involved
either directly or indirectly in the sale of securities need a clearer
explanation of when seller liability attaches than that provided by the
Haberman court. The Washington legislature should clarify this area
by amending the seller liability statute to limit liability to persons who
are directly involved in sales or who pass title to securities. Enactment
of a new statute expressly providing for issuer liability could also elim-
inate some of the confusion. Until these legislative corrections are
made, courts and litigants should apply the new substantial contribu-
tive factor test for seller liability only to defendants who engage in
direct, face-to-face selling or who pass title to the securities sold.
Barbara L. Schmidt
790
Vol. 63:769, 1988
